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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal involves interpretation of the Idaho Public Records Act, Idaho Code §§ 
9-335, et seq. The genesis of the underlying action was Petitioner Jamee Lee Wade's ("Wade") 
request for "the complete investigation, to include all reports, and all documentary evidence ... 
regarding the shooting of Mr. Jamee Lee Wade." (R pp. 6-7.) The request was received during 
the Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney' s I ("CCP A") review of the investigation for potential 
criminal charges. Based upon the active nature of the investigation and its on-going review, the 
CCP A declined to relinquish the file. Wade filed a petition to compel release of the records so 
he could submit a Notice of Tort Claim. (R p. 4.) The District Court determined that the active 
investigation and review by the CCP A were not exempt from disclosure and ordered the 
investigation produced. The CCP A appealed. 
The Idaho Prosecuting Attorneys Association ("IP AA") is a non-party seeking amicus 
status to file this brief and argue in support of the CCP A. 2 
A. The Course of Proceedings Below. 
After denial of his written requests for the complete police investigation and documentary 
evidence, Wade filed a petition in District Court to access the same. (R pp. 3-38.) The CCPA 
filed an Answer to Wade's Petition, asserting the active nature of the investigation and the 
review for possible criminal charges protected the investigation from disclosure. (R pp. 39-49.) 
I As explained more fully in the Statement of Facts section below, the Canyon County 
Prosecuting Attorney was appointed as the "Special" Prosecuting Attorney. 
2 The IP AA has not seen the contents of the investigation. 
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The District Court undertook an in camera review of the investigation and on June 5, 2012, 
issued a memorandum decision designating the investigation "inactive," and ordering its release. 
(R pp. 50-54.) 
The CCPA moved the District Court to Alter or Amend its Judgment (R pp. 55-82), and 
the District Court again ruled to release the records, despite agreeing that the investigation was 
active. (R p. 100.) This time, however, the District Court added language limiting the disclosure 
of the documents to Wade and his counsel for inclusion in a tort claim and use in any subsequent 
civil litigation. (R pp. 99-103.) 
The CCP A appealed the decision to this Court. (R pp. 104-108.) 
B. Statement of Facts. 
On December 22, 2011, a Fruitland police officer responded to a New Plymouth call 
about an intoxicated person making threats to kill his mother. (R pp. 64-65.) Upon arriving on 
the scene, the officer observed Wade get out of a sport utility vehicle. (R p. 65.) Wade 
approached the officer's patrol car in an "aggressive and determined manner." ld. The officer 
warned Wade to stop or "he would shoot." ld. Wade continued, stating, "F ___ do it then." 
ld. The officer fired twice and Wade clutched his chest and fell to the ground. ld. The officer 
then ordered Wade to stay on the ground. ld. Wade replied, "F_ you," and stood up. ld. The 
officer stepped away and ordered Wade back to the ground. ld. Wade ignored the command and 
the officer fired three additional rounds. ld. Wade again fell to the ground. ld. A second officer 
arrived on the scene. ld. The officers then called emergency medical services. ld. 
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The Idaho State Police ("ISP") also responded to the scene and began their investigation 
of the officer-involved shooting. (R p. 64.) 
Because of the potential conflict of interest involved in reviewing the actions of a police 
officer who works in their jurisdiction, the Payette County Prosecuting Attorney's Office 
("PCPA") requested that the CCPA act as Special Prosecuting Attorney.3 (R p. 65.) CCPA 
accepted the appointment on February 14, 2012, and Christopher Topmiller, the CCPA's Chief 
Criminal Deputy, began his review of the matter. (R pp. 65-66.) Prior to deciding whether any 
charges would be filed, the CCP A requested further investigation. (R pp. 66-67.) 
While this additional investigation was underway, Wade, through his attorney, filed a 
public records request with the CCP A, requesting copies of the ongoing ISP investigation, as he 
was considering filing a civil lawsuit against various governmental entities and wanted the 
investigation reports to "evaluate the merits of the tort claim." (R p. 51.) The CCPA sent Wade 
a letter denying his request for the investigation records, stating, "[ d]ue to the fact the 
investigation of this case is pending, your request ... must be denied, pursuant to Idaho Code § 
9-335, because disclosure ... would interfere with enforcement proceedings and could deprive 
the parties of the right to a fair trial or impartial adjudication." (R p. 35.) 
Ten days after the CCPA received the results of the additional investigation, and prior to 
the CCPA reaching a determination on whether to file charges in this matter, Wade filed a 
Petition in District Court to gain access to the investigation. (R p. 67.) 
3 Duly appointed special prosecutors have the same power as the elected prosecutor to file 
charges, lesser charges, and/or decline prosecution against a defendant. See Stare v. Bacon, 117 
Idaho 679, 791 P.2d 429 (1990). 
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II. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
A. Did the District Court Err by Ordering the Public Release of an Active Police 
Investigation of an Officer-Involved Shooting While Such Matter Was Being 
Reviewed by the Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney? 
B. Did the District Court Usurp the Discretion Allowed the Canyon County 
Prosecuting Attorney by Creating a Filing "Deadline?" 
III. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
The IP AA does not seek attorneys' fees on appeal. 
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Idaho Supreme Court reviews of Public Records Act appeals do not always set out the 
applicable standard of review. See, e.g., Federated Publ 'ns, Inc. v. Boise City, 128 Idaho 459, 
915 P.2d 21 (1996). In later cases, however, the Court explained: 
When this Court considers an appeal from the denial of a public records request, it 
affirms a district court's findings of fact unless the findings are clearly erroneous. 
Bolger v. Lance, 137 Idaho 792, 794, 53 P.3d 1211, 1213 (2002) (citing 
DeChambeau v. Estate of Smith, 132 Idaho 568, 571, 976 P.2d 922,925 (1999)). 
"[FJindings ... based upon substantial and competent ... evidence will not be 
disturbed on appeal." Id. This Court, however, exercises free review over 
matters of law. !d. (citing Bouten Constr. Co. v. HF. Magnuson Co., 133 Idaho 
756, 760, 992 P.2d 751,755 (1999)). 
Gibson v. Ada County, 138 Idaho 787, 789, 69 P.3d 1048, 1050 (2003). 
The IP AA forwards that in this case, the issue is whether the District Court erred in its 
application of the Idaho Public Records Act, and 
"This Court exercises free review over questions oflaw." Fuller v. Callister, 150 
Idaho 848, 851, 252 P .3d 1266, 1269 (2011). This Court also exercises "free 
review over matters of statutory interpretation." KGF Dev., LLC v. City of 
Ketchum, 149 Idaho 524, 527,236 P.3d 1284, 1287 (2010) (quoting State v. Doe, 
147 Idaho 326, 327, 208 P.3d 730, 731 (2009)). 
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Brannon v. City a/Coeur d'Alene, WL 5664609 (Idaho Nov. 16,2012). 
V. ARGUMENT 
As noted in its Application for Amicus Status, the IP AA was established to assist Idaho's 
prosecutors in the pursuit of justice and to be their voice in support of that effort. The IP AA 
brings a unique perspective to public records issues since prosecutors are at the forefront of the 
Public Records Act's application. Whether analyzing the Act on behalf of the county treasurer, 
assessor, clerk/auditor/recorder, coroner and/or county commissioners, the interpretation and 
application of this statute are a regular part of a prosecutor's duties. 
When requests are received for copies of ongoing criminal investigations and/or 
prosecutors' active files, Idaho statutes and case law preclude access to either. In the case at bar, 
however, the District Court allowed the ongoing investigation to be released. A judicial decision 
ordering the release of a pending investigation, as it is being considered by a prosecutor for 
potential criminal charges, portends negatively for Idaho law enforcement. Because this 
determination seems contrary to practice and applicable law, the IP AA Board of Directors felt 
compelled to petition this Court for Amicus status, supporting the CCP A. 
A. Did the District Court Err by Ordering the Public Release of an Active Police 
Investigation of an Officer-Involved Shooting While Such Matter Was Being 
Reviewed by the Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney? 
1. Idaho Public Records Act. 
Idaho Code § 9-338(1) states "there is a presumption that all public records in Idaho are 
open at all reasonable times for inspection except as otherwise expressly provided by statute." 
Accordingly, once a request for an identifiable record is made, if the records fit within the 
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definition set out in Idaho Code § 9-337(13), and if there are no applicable exemptions, the 
record must be made available for inspection. 
a. Genesis of the Act: Dalton v. Dairy Commission. 
Interpretation and analysis of the Idaho Public Records Act requires viewing the statute 
in context. To do that, a review of its brief history is helpful. 
The catalyst for the Act was Dalton v. Dairy Comm'n, 107 Idaho 6, 684 P.2d 983 (1984). 
In that case, Mr. Dalton requested the names and addresses of all Idaho dairy farmers from the 
Idaho Dairy Commission. The Commission refused his request, contending that the dairy 
farmers "provided the[ir] names ... in exchange for a promise of confidentiality" and "to disclose 
the list of these names would both breach this confidentiality and jeopardize a valuable property 
right of the dealers by opening up to the public and thereby exposing to the vagaries of 
competitive bidding, a customer list acquired through painstaking travail." Id. at 8, 684 P.2d at 
985. Dalton contended "that the membership list ... he [sought was] a public record subject to 
inspection by authority of statute." Id. 
Denied his request for the list, Dalton filed a lawsuit seeking the records. The District 
Court sided with the Commission, writing: 
Id. 
This Court is of the opinion that the statutes and authorities, submitted by the 
plaintiff, do not apply to mailing lists of members of associations for 
advertisement purposes. Such mailing lists are valuable property rights, and 
should not be available to everyone. An association has not only the right, but the 
duty, to protect its members from possible harassment and solicitations. Members 
of an association correctly assume that their officers and directors will watch their 
interests. 
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Dalton appealed the District Court's holding, and, in a 3-2 decision, this Court overturned 
the lower court, allowing Dalton access to the names and addresses, explaining: 
[W]e note that the Commission may always seek recourse with the legislature. In 
holding today that disclosure is mandated under our present statutory scheme, we 
of course are mindful that such a scheme may be amended. Should the legislature 
decide that such information should indeed be confidential, it may amend the 
relevant statutes to include exceptions .... 
Id. at 12,684 P.2d at 989. 
b. The Idaho Legislature Has Chosen to Protect Police and Prosecutor Records. 
The Legislature accepted this Court's invitation to "amend the relevant statutes" and in 
1986 enacted Idaho Code § 9-335, a stand-alone, self-contained public records law. 
Interestingly, the statute was not promulgated to protect such records as were the subject of the 
Dalton case - rather it protected law enforcement, prosecutors and the Attorney General's Office 
- constituencies that were immediately concerned their criminal investigations and files might be 
made public under Dalton. See H.B. 586, Statement of Purpose, 48th Leg., 2d. R. Sess. (Idaho 
1986); Idaho Public Records Act, 1986 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 210. The Legislature noted that 
the statute was enacted in direct response to Dalton. 
The new statute's preamble provided that the legislation was "to provide that certain law 
enforcement agency records shall be confidential and exempt from disclosure .... " Idaho Public 
Records Act, 1986 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 210, p. 543. More specifically, the language spoke to 
police investigations and the potential damage premature release of those records could cause. 
Id. 
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While protecting law enforcement records was the immediate priority, four years later the 
Legislature began providing protection to other government records. See Idaho Code §§ 9-337, 
et seq. Today, in the almost thirty (30) years since Dalton was decided, the legislature has 
expanded4 the original § 9-335 to: §§ 9-337, 338, 339, 340A, 340B, 340C, 340D, 340F, 340G, 
340H, 341, 342, 342A, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, and 349A. While many of the above 
listed statutes are procedural, the actual protections number over 90 categories of records. 
In effect, then, the genesis and continued effect of the Idaho Public Records Act is both a 
procedure to ensure review of public, non-exempt records, and a shield for records which, if 
disclosed, could be problematic. 
c. Idaho Code § 9-335 and Case Law Interpreting the Statute Prohibits the 
Release of Police and Prosecutor Records. 
i. State and Federal Law 
Protection of "active" and portions of "inactive"S investigatory records is rooted in the 
plain wording of the statute and applicable case law. 
The operative portion ofIdaho Code § 9-335(1)(a-f) states: 
[N]othing in this chapter ... shall be construed to require disclosure of 
investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes by a law 
enforcement agency ... to the extent that the production of such records would: 
(a) Interfere with enforcement proceedings; 
(b) Deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication; 
(c) Constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; 
4 Some existing protections were simply relocated into the Act. 
5 Although the statute does not contain the word "active" when referring to an ongoing 
investigation, it seems fairly implied by the reference to an "inactive" investigatory record in 
Idaho Code § 9-335(3). 
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(e) Disclose investigative techniques and procedures; or 
(f) Endanger the life or physical safety oflaw enforcement personnel. 
Idaho Code § 9-335(3) defines an "investigatory record" as "information with respect to 
an identifiable person or group of persons compiled by a law enforcement agency in the course 
of conducting an investigation of a specific act or omission." "Law Enforcement Agency" 
includes "the Idaho state police" and "the office of any prosecuting attorney." !d. 
In Bolger v. Lance, 137 Idaho 792, 53 P.3d 1211 (2002), this Court had the opportunity 
to decide a request very similar to Wade's.6 The Petitioner-Appellant in Bolger sought records 
from the Idaho Attorney General that might disclose whether the Attorney General was 
conducting an investigation about him or if the Attorney General had received requests to 
conduct one. The Petitioner was denied access to the investigatory records by the Attorney 
General, the district court and this Court. This Court explained: 
Under this rule, it might at first seem that I.e. § 9-342 should apply, because it 
specifically grants an individual the right to examine public records that relate to 
that person, even if those records are otherwise exempt from public disclosure. 
I.C. § 9-342(1). However, subsection (3) of that statute limits the applicability of 
subsection (1) by excluding "otherwise exempt investigatory records ... if the 
investigation is ongoing," which implicitly defers to the exemption contained in 
I.C. § 9-340B. Idaho Code section 9-340B, in tum, defers to I.C. § 9-335 for a 
more specific definition of the investigatory records exemption. Additionally, the 
legislature made it absolutely clear that the provisions of I.e. § 9-335 are to 
control over any contrary provisions when it began that section with the phrase 
"Notwithstanding any statute or rule of the court to the contrary." Consequently, 
section 9-335 controls the overall analysis .... Based on our review of the 
withheld documents, we conclude that the documents themselves were substantial 
6 In his April 19, 2012 Petition, Wade raised, as an alternative argument, that Idaho Code § 9-
342 allows access to "his" records. (R p. 9.) That is the same argument this Court rejected in 
Bolger. 
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and competent evidence to satisfy the AG's burden of persuasion and to support 
the district court's finding that the withheld records were "investigatory records," 
under I.C. § 9-335(2). Additionally, our review of the documents and the record 
reveals that disclosure of the documents would clearly "interfere with law 
enforcement proceedings" or "disclose investigative techniques and procedures." 
Id. at 796,53 P.3d at 1215. 
Five years later, this Court decided Nation v. State, Dept. of Correction, 144 Idaho 177, 
158 P.3d 953 (2007). In Nation, personal information about Idaho penitentiary guards was 
inadvertently included in a criminal discovery response. Defense counsel in the underlying 
criminal case shared that information with the Prisoner-Defendant who disseminated it to other 
inmates. The guards brought suit against the penitentiary (Department of Corrections/State of 
Idaho) and the Ada County Prosecuting Attorney. The guards argued that the penitentiary 
employees had publically released their private facts. Explaining the release was not "public," 
this Court explained: 
In tum, the sheriffs office and the Ada County Prosecutor were entitled to have 
the identifying information for investigatory and prosecutorial purposes. 
Likewise, Cahill and Persons were entitled to the umedacted forms in order to 
authenticate them and defend against any restitution claim. Moreover, under the 
Idaho Public Records Act, title 9, chapter 3, Idaho Code, these records are 
exempt from public disclosure. Ie. §§ 9-340B(1); 9-335. The information here 
was an investigatory record, I.C. § 9-337(6), and the IDOC, sheriffs office and 
Ada County Prosecutor are law enforcement agencies, I.C. § 9-337(7). 
Id. at 188-89, 158 P.3d at 964-65 (emphasis added). 
Nation recognized Idaho Code § 9-335's protection of investigatory records when in 
police and prosecutor hands. 
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Federal law is consistent, and its analysis is relevant to the present case. The operative 
portions of Idaho Code § 9-335(1) were borrowed from 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(7) of the federal 
Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") almost verbatim. 7 Consequently, the case law 
interpreting that statute is presumed adopted as well: "Thus, we presume that our legislature 
intended to adopt reasonable constructions of the statute that were established by California 
courts prior to its adoption in Idaho." Collection Bureau, Inc. v. Dorsey, 150 Idaho 695, 699; 
249 P .3d 1150, 1154 (2011). 
In NL.R.B. v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214 (1978), the National Labor 
Relations Board ("NLRB") filed an unfair labor practice complaint against Robbins. Robbins 
requested, pursuant to FOIA, that the NLRB make available copies of all potential witnesses' 
statements collected during the NLRB's investigation. This request was denied on the ground 
that the statements were exempt from disclosure under, inter alia, Exemption 7(A) of FOIA, 
which provides that disclosure is not required of investigatory records compiled for law 
enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such records would interfere 
with enforcement proceedings. 
The district court ordered the information released. The United States Supreme Court 
disagreed, finding the information protected: 
The starting point of our analysis is with the language and structure of the statute. 
We can find little support in the language of the statute itself for respondent's 
7 FOIA has been amended since Idaho borrowed its language, and now reads differently. But 
when NL.R.B. was decided, FOIA read as Idaho's current statute reads. 
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view that determinations of "interference" under Exemption 7(A) can be made 
only on a case-by-case basis. Indeed, the literal language of Exemption 7 as a 
whole tends to suggest that the contrary is true. The Exemption applies to: 
investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but 
only to the extent that the production of such records would (A) 
interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) deprive a person of a 
right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) constitute an 
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) disclose the identity 
of a confidential source and, in the case of a record compiled by a 
criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal 
investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national 
security intelligence investigation, confidential information 
furnished only by the confidential source, (E) disclose 
investigative techniques and procedures, or (F) endanger the life or 
physical safety oflaw enforcement personnel. 
There is a readily-apparent difference between subdivision (A) and subdivisions 
(B), (C), and (D). The latter subdivisions refer to particular cases-"a person," "an 
unwarranted invasion," "a confidential source"-and thus seem to require a 
showing that the factors made relevant by the statute are present in each distinct 
situation. By contrast, since subdivision (A) speaks in the plural voice about 
"enforcement proceedings," it appears to contemplate that certain generic 
determinations might be made. 
!d. at 223-24 (emphasis added). The Court continued: 
In originally enacting Exemption 7, Congress recognized that law enforcement 
agencies had legitimate needs to keep certain records confidential, lest the 
agencies be hindered in their investigations or placed at a disadvantage when it 
came time to present their case. Foremost among the purposes of this Exemption 
was to prevent "harm [to] the Government's case in court," ... by not allowing 
litigants "earlier or greater access" to agency investigatory files than they would 
otherwise have. 
Id. at 224-25. The Court further instructed: 
Our reluctance to override a long tradition of agency discovery, based on nothing 
more than an amendment to a statute designed to deal with a wholly different 
problem, is strengthened by our conclusion that the dangers posed by premature 
release of the statements sought here would involve precisely the kind of 
"interference with enforcement proceedings" that Exemption 7(A) was designed 
to avoid ... The most obvious risk of "interference" with enforcement proceedings 
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in this context is that employers Of, in some cases, unions will coerce or 
intimidate employees and others who have given statements, in an effort to make 
them change their testimony or not testify at all. This special danger flowing from 
prehearing discovery in NLRB proceedings has been recognized by the courts for 
many years .... 
Id. at 239. And finally: 
Respondent concedes that it seeks these statements solely for litigation discovery 
purposes, and that FOIA was not intended to function as a private discovery 
tool.. .. 
Id. at 242 (citations omitted). 
The District Court's approach to Wade's Petition appears contrary to the U.S. Supreme 
Court's instruction in NL.R.B. Here, the District Court required proof of interference "in this 
particular case." (Tr May 4, 2012, p. 4, LL. 22-25; p. 5, LL. 1-6.) At the hearing on the matter, 
the District Court commented: "[T]he facts are facts. Those aren't going to change," (Tr May 
17,2012, p. 4, LL. 24-25), and "So what enforcement proceedings are under - being undertaken, 
and how is this request interfering with it?" (Tr May 4,2012, p. 6, LL. 2-4). Further: "So those 
documents would have to show on their face that to disclose them to Mr. Wade would interfere 
with your proceedings or deprive either a fair trial against Mr. Wade or a fair trial against the 
officer in question, and I'm not hearing a lot of reasons why the court should find those things 
apply ... I mean, if I look at these documents is it just going to jump off the page and say, oh, 
yeah, this is going to be a problem if this is disclosed to Mr. Wade right now?" (Tr May 17, 
2012, p. 10, LL. 2-16.) 
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The District Court continued with this reasonmg m its June 5, 2012 Memorandum 
Decision: "The statute reqUIres the interference would result. The Court cannot make that 
finding." (R p. 53, emphasis added.) 
The District Court sought proof of interference with the investigation that would "jump 
off the page." But the U.S. Supreme Court's admonition is to focus more broadly, i.e. not to 
dwell on the "tree" when interpreting these sections, but rather to look at the forest: "We can 
find little support in the language of the statute itself for respondent's view that determinations of 
interference under Exemption 7(A) can be made only on a case-by-case basis." Id. at 223, 224. 
And "By contrast, since subdivision (A) speaks in the plural voice about enforcement 
proceedings, it appears to contemplate that certain generic determinations might be made." Id. at 
223,224. 
As required by the U.S. Supreme Court, and recognized by this Court in Nation, the 
investigatory records in this case are by their very nature exempt from disclosure. The District 
Court erred by requiring their release. 
d. Release of the Records Would Interfere with Enforcement Proceedings. 
In the case at bar, the District Court's approach was contrary to the U.S. Supreme Court's 
teaching. In effect, the District Court insisted the CCP A prove the release would harm the 
investigation and then predict the specific negative occurrences if the documents were released. 
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However, though not required by the law, even a cursory review of the Record8 shows that the 
District Court had ample reasons to find that the records' release would result in interference. 
The District Court described the contents of the investigation file: "[T]here are three 
white ring binders. Two of these binders contain the Petitioner's medical records. The third 
binder contains police reports; interviews with witnesses, the alleged victim, and the officer 
involved; 911 audio recordings; dispatch reports, photographs, and a video of the shooting." (R 
p.52.) 
Once that investigation information leaves law enforcement's hands (via hard copy, a 
reader's memory or shared from another) it could end up anywhere. In the case at bar the 
District Court decision allowed a "limited" release to Wade and his attorney (R p. 102), but even 
that sharing has repercussions. Since this is an investigation into Wade's potential criminal 
activity, Wade himself is either a potential suspect or key witness. Ifhe reads police descriptions 
of the events, witness statements, officer's statements, views videos, or listens to 911 recordings, 
the after-learned information will taint his recollection or potentially supplant it, interfering with 
future proceedings.9 
The District Court's June 5, 2012 Memorandum Decision (R p. 102) specifically allows 
the released information to be used in a tort claim - a publically filed document, and/or in civil 
litigation - a public forum. Allowing information released from the investigation to be produced 
8 Had the District Court followed the instruction of the U.S. Supreme Court, the District Court 
could only have reached the conclusion not to release the documents. 
9 This is not a criticism of Wade. Any human who learns information from another witness's 
perspective will have their memory changed. We tend to "fill in holes" in our less-than-perfect 
memories. This will interfere with accurate enforcement proceedings. 
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in a notice of tort claim could very likely lead to local media and internet dissemination. This is 
the recipe for the interference the U.S. Supreme Court prohibits. 
There are further concerns. Sometimes the fact that a suspect knows "too much" about a 
crime tips police to his guilt. If a suspect obtained that extra information from a newspaper, the 
internet, social media, publically filed tort claim or civil complaint, that facet of solving a crime 
is obviated - thus, interfering with enforcement. 
Another significant concern is that a suspect, upon learning the police are close to 
identifying him or her, could take flight - or buy firearms and tum his or her home into a 
stronghold. Further, revealing the identity of an accusing witness, or divulging the new address 
for the same witness who moved for safety reasons would allow a suspect to locate, intimidate or 
even eliminate that witness/victim, interfering with enforcement. 
Early access to a police investigation would give a suspect the opportunity to invent an 
original version, or, perhaps, an "improved" second or third version, of his statement which, 
while untrue, has been carefully crafted after learning the information the detective has 
compiled, interfering with enforcement. 
Additionally, releasing investigatory information before the criminal process is finished 
could taint jurors who learn information outside of court - again, interfering with enforcement 
and depriving an individual of a fair trial. 
If the investigation is ordered released to a non-prosecutor source, that information is not 
subject to the safeguards of Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct 3.6 and 3.8. If the secondary 
release is from a non-attorney there are no restrictions. This could result in undue public and 
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media pressure on the court regarding bond-setting, etc., interfering with enforcement, and 
depriving an individual of a fair trial. 
Another concern, shared by the U.S. Supreme Court, is that public release of witness 
statements, especially those that contain sensitive, embarrassing and potentially damaging 
information, will have the long-term effect of hampering future witness cooperation with law 
enforcement, interfering with enforcement and depriving individuals of a fair trial. 
For all of these reasons, the release of these investigatory records would clearly result in 
the interference of enforcement proceedings - a result which is prohibited by the U.S. Supreme 
Court. 
e. Release of the Records Results m an Unwarranted Invasion of Personal 
Privacy. 
The operative privacy portion ofIdaho Code § 9-335(1)(c) states: 
[N]othing in this chapter... shall be construed to require disclosure of 
investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes by a law 
enforcement agency ... to the extent that the production of such records would: 
(c) Constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. 
Privacy is a subjective concept. But there is an objective element as well. Idaho case law 
gives guidance as to the legal parameters. In Nation v. State, Dept. of Correction, supra, this 
Court explained: 
Idaho recognizes the tort of invasion of privacy with four different categories, 
including public disclosure of private facts .... In order to make out a claim for 
public disclosure of pri vate facts "there must be a public disclosure [and] the facts 
disclosed must be entitled to be private." ... Additionally, "the matter made public 
must be one which would be offensive and objectionable to a reasonable man of 
ordinary sensibilities." 
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Id. at 188, 158 P.3d at 964 (citations omitted). 
The Court continued: "There is no dispute that the unredacted worker's compensation 
forms contained private information and a reasonable person would not want those facts made 
public. It is left for this Court to decide, then, whether there was a public disclosure of these 
private facts." Id. 
In Uranga v. Federated Publ 'ns, Inc., 138 Idaho 550, 67 P.3d 29 (2003), Uranga alleged 
the Idaho Statesman newspaper had published an article that many of his "friends, neighbors, 
acquaintances, business associates, and family had read ... and had seen the reference to 
himself." Id. at 553, 67 P.3d at 32. This Court explained that Idaho: 
[R]ecognize[s] four categories of invasion of privacy: (1) Intrusion upon the 
plaintiff's seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs; (2) Public disclosure of 
embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff; (3) Publicity which places the 
plaintiff in a false light in the public eye; and (4) Appropriation, for the 
defendant's advantage, of the plaintiffs name and likeness. 
Id. at 553 n. 1,67 P.3d at 32 n. 1 (citations omitted). The Opinion continues: 
Liability for a claim of invasion of privacy by intrusion must be based upon an 
intentional interference with the plaintiff's interest in solitude or seclusion, either 
as to his person or as to his private affairs or concerns .... This form of invasion 
of privacy does not depend upon any pUblicity given to the person whose interest 
is invaded or to his affairs. "To be actionable, the prying or intrusion into the 
plaintiff's private affairs must be of a type which is offensive to a reasonable 
person." 
Id. at 553, 67 P.3d at 32 (citations omitted). 
The genesis of a criminal investigation, by its nature, is an accusation of a cnme. 
Criminal allegations are embarrassing, offensive and objectionable if true, and dramatically so if 
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untrue. When untrue, whether the allegations were reported intentionally or innocently, the 
allegations are still recorded in an official investigation. The allegations are investigated to 
determine the basis of the charges, their accuracy, and whether the allegations, if true, are 
provable and criminal. 
The contents of the file in this case are Wade's medical records; police reports; 
interviews with witnesses, the alleged victim, and the officer involved; 911 audio recordings; and 
dispatch reports, photographs, and a video of the shooting. (R p. 53.) 
This investigation and the surrounding allegations involve sensitive matters for Wade, the 
officer, and witnesses. The parties and witnesses may have to reveal sensitive, even personal 
matters about themselves or other witnesses. The subject of those revelations may be medical, 
mental, or even an embarrassing habit or peccadillo. This information that a person would not 
normally reveal (if not asked by the police) for fear of embarrassment or reprisal, is now in a 
police report. Making the release of information even more disconcerting is the fact that 
witnesses and victims are often swept into criminal events randomly. These privacy concerns 
swirl around every criminal investigation and prosecution, for every person whose name appears 
in a police report. Public reaction to police shootings ranges from support to outrage to 
ambivalence. Often, there are societal and potentially employment repercussions. 
While release of portions of the investigation mayor may not be preventable long term, 
certainly, out of respect for those involved and our justice system, any disclosure must wait until 
all criminal matters (if any) are inactive. 
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f. The Act is Not a Discovery Tool. 
The April 19, 2012 "Petition For Access to Public Records" (R p. 3) explains, "Mr. Wade 
seeks information ... that will allow him to prepare a comprehensive tort claim." (R p. 4.)10 
The District Court's June 5, 2012 Memorandum Decision (R p. 50) recites: 
Petitioner is considering a claim under the Idaho Tort Claims Act (!TCA) against 
certain government entity(ies) related to a December 22, 2011 incident involving 
Petitioner and a Fruitland Police Officer in which Petitioner was shot twice. 
Under I.C. § 6-906, the Petitioner must file a tort claim by June 19, 2012. In 
order to evaluate the merits of the tort claim, Petitioner has requested copies of 
reports related to the incident that were prepared by the Idaho State Police, 
Fruitland Police Department, and Payette County Sherriff's Department. 
(Rp.5l.) 
The District Court asked Wade's attorney: "What about a protective order that allows you 
as counsel in evaluating the tort claim to review them but not disclose them to your client?" (Tr 
May 17,2012, p. 14, L. 25; p. 15, LL. 1-2.) And "[I] wantto make sure I confirm this, thatthe-
that you have approximately 55 days before the time period runs to file a tort claim?" (Tr May 4, 
2012, p. 15, LL. 16-19.) 
Wade laments in his Response to the CCP A's Motion to Alter that "The Idaho Tort 
Claims Act does not provide for a hearing in which a party can be compelled to produce 
documents to support a claimant's position or otherwise inform the claimant of facts that may 
weaken the claim." (R p. 93.) 
10 The reference to a "pending Tort Claim" in the District Court's second decision suggests 
Wade actually filed a Notice of Tort Claim despite not accessing the investigation records. (R p. 
102.) Wade clearly was able to file his tort claim without the assistance of the investigatory 
records. 
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The District Court, in its June 5, 2012 Memorandum Decision releasing the investigation, 
writes: "Under the facts known to the Petitioner at this time, he can effectively submit a tort 
claim; however, his ability to pursue this claim will be hindered unless given access to the 
requested documents." (R p. 51.) 
Wade correctly asserts the Idaho Tort Claims Act does not provide a civil pre-filing 
discovery tool. However, the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure do. II 
The Public Records Act was not intended to supplant the rules of civil procedure. It is 
not a private litigant's discovery tool. Not only is there no provision allowing for such 
utilization, both FOIA and the Idaho Act forbid it. The U.S. Supreme Court, in NL.R.B., supra, 
succinctly explained: "Respondent concedes that it seeks these statements solely for litigation 
discovery purposes, and that FOIA was not intended to function as a private discovery tool." 
NL.R.B., 437 U.S. at 242 (citations omitted, emphasis in original). Likewise, the Idaho 
Legislature enacted Idaho Code § 9-343(3): "nor shall sections 9-335 through 9-348, Idaho 
Code, be available to supplement, augment, substitute or supplant discovery procedures in any 
other federal, civil or administrative proceeding." The Statement of Purpose to this statutory 
amendment read: "This legislation is intended to underscore the legislature's intent that the 
Idaho Public Records Act was never intended for use as a discovery vehicle for civil, criminal or 
administrative litigation." Statement of Purpose, H.B. 151 (as amended), 56th Leg., 1st R. Sess. 
(Idaho 2001). 
II See, e.g., Rule 27(a)(1). Depositions before action. 
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Viewing Wade's discovery attempt from the Supreme Court's recommended "forest," 
rather than "trees," vantage-point makes it clearer. One could hardly expect the same law 
enacted to protect criminal investigations from release to be the very law that would provide 
access to the investigations it was designed to safeguard. The idea that the Act is a discovery 
mechanism would vitiate its genesis - protecting law enforcement files. 
The District Court queried whether release of the criminal investigation to only Mr. 
Wade's attorney would be a satisfactory compromise. Supra. It would not. If the documents are 
released to an attorney, even if an attorney does not show the documents to his client, the 
attorney is now privy to the information contained in the investigation. If the client might later 
be charged criminally, the attorney is aware of the identity of witnesses and the witness's 
statements that the Act was designed to protect. In the case at bar, providing full information to 
the potential criminal defense attorney so he can begin locating and interviewing the same 
witnesses at the same time the prosecutor is contemplating charging, and allowing the attorney to 
advise his client based upon the information he collects, will interfere with the investigation. 
The same holds true if the purpose for release is civil discovery. The attorney will still be 
locating and interviewing those same witnesses. Either way, the release of the investigation will 
interfere with enforcement proceedings. 
B. Did the District Court Usurp the Discretion Allowed the Canyon County 
Prosecuting Attorney by Creating a Filing "Deadline?" 
The CCP A represented to the District Court that the investigation was "ongoing." (Tr 
May 17,2012, p.1, LL. 18-19.) Contrary to the CCPA's representation, in its Memorandum 
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Decision the District Court described the investigation as "inactive." Premised upon its 
"inactive" finding, the District Court next determined that because the investigation was 
submitted to the CCP A it could be released. 
The IP AA forwards that the District Court erred in these determinations. First, 
prosecutorial discretion precludes the Court from ignoring the prosecutor's assertion and finding 
the ongoing review "inactive." Second, that the police submitted their investigation to the 
Prosecutor does not extinguish the Act's protection under Idaho law. Third, even if the matter 
was (and it was not) inactive, the Act still applies to protect the investigation. 
1. The Investigation is Ongoing and Active. 
On May 17, 2012, the CCPA informed the Court: "Your honor, unfortunately [the] 
investigation is ongoing." (Tr May 17,2012, p. 1, LL. 18-19.) At the same hearing, the District 
Court commented: 
Which makes this really problematic in the sense that the Canyon County 
Prosecutor's Office essentially has as its client Payette County. And to the extent 
that you're delaying your investigation it impacts negatively Payette County 
because they cannot review the specifics of a possible tort claim against them to 
determine whether or not to settle this without a lawsuit. So there's some reasons 
to think that the Canyon County Prosecutor's Office needs to act with haste for 
the benefit of their client.,,12 
12 The reference by the District Court that the CCPA had an "obligation" to expedite its review 
on behalf of its "client" Payette County seems civilly focused and unclear. The CCPA was acting 
in place of the Payette County Prosecuting Attorney because of the declared Payette County 
conflict. The investigation and review are criminal in nature. Whatever Payette County's civil 
exposure may be seems of no professional concern to the CCP A. There appears to be no basis in 
the record to create an "attorney - client" relationship between the two counties, nor any 
obligation by Canyon County other than a thorough, thoughtful criminal review of the incident. 
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(Tr May 17,2012, p. 17, LL. 4-11.) The District Court added: "And when we were here before 
you seemed fairly certain that the investigation would be completed by now. So now it seems 
like it could be unending." (Tr May 17,2012, p. 11, LL. 24-25; p. 12, LL. 1-2.) 
In its June 5, 2012 Memorandum Decision (R p. 50), the District Court cited to a letter 
from the PCP A describing the investigation as "being completed" (R p. 52), and opined: 
"Nevertheless, the Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney's Office continues to maintain that this 
remains on ongoing investigation even though over four and one-half months have gone by with 
no activity." (R p. 52.) 
In its written Memorandum Decision the District Court declared the investigation 
"inactive" (R p. 52), citing to Idaho Code §9-335(3) (R p. 52), and explained that the Idaho Code 
"clearly sets forth that an inactive investigatory record shall be disclosed .... " (R p. 52, emphasis 
in original.) The Court then ordered the investigation released. 13 (R p. 54.) 
The District Court's comments, both written and oral, suggest that the CCPA's review 
was taking too long. The District Court then deemed the matter inactive, and ordered the file 
released. The IP AA forwards that the District Court's determination the investigation was 
inactive, contrary to the CCP A's assertion and applicable law, was in error. 
13 The Idaho Public Records Act differentiates the protection of investigatory records when the 
investigation becomes "inactive." See I.e. § 9-335(3). The District Court's second decision 
(Memorandum Decision and Order on Motion to Alter or Amend, R p. 99) forwards that its 
earlier finding was not based upon the status of the investigation: "Although the Court discussed 
the subject of whether this investigation was active vs. inactive in its original Memorandum 
Decision, this distinction was not particularly important to this Court's decision. If the State 
wishes to characterize it as an active and ongoing investigation, so be it." (R p. 100.) 
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Dynamics surround police investigations and prosecution filing determinations to which 
courts are not privy. This aspect of law enforcement and prosecution is separate by design. 
The Constitution of the State of Idaho provides that a "prosecuting attorney shall be 
elected for each organized county in the state." Idaho CONST. art. V, § 18. Idaho Code § 31-
2604 sets out the duties of the prosecuting attorney, explaining: the prosecuting attorney is to 
"prosecute or defend all actions, applications or motions, civil or criminal, in the district court of 
his county in which the people, or the state, or the county, are interested, or are a party." 
Prosecuting attorneys are vested with the right to prosecute criminal cases, but they are 
also "vested with broad discretion in deciding when [ ... ] to prosecute." State v. Horn, 101 Idaho 
192,196,610 P.2d 551, 555 (1980) (emphasis added). In 1987, this Court explained: 
In a similar context, a prosecutor has some discretion in deciding when to charge 
an accused. As LaFave and Israel points out, "[t]he notion that the prosecuting 
attorney is vested with a broad range of discretion in deciding when to prosecute 
and when not to is firmly entrenched in American law." 2 LaFave and Israel, 
Criminal Procedures § 13.2 (1984). 
State v. Edmonson, 113 Idaho 230, 235,743 P.2d 459, 464 (1987). 
These concepts are ingrained in the very fabric of American jurisprudence. The Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals observed: 
It cannot be disputed that under our system of separation of powers, the decision 
whether to prosecute, and the decision as to the charge to be filed, rests in the 
discretion of the Attorney General or his delegates, the United States Attorneys. 
The Executive Branch has "exclusive and absolute discretion to decide whether to 
prosecute." See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693-94, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 
3100,41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974), citing Confiscation Cases, 7 Wall. 454,19 L.Ed. 
196 (1869). The discretion to prosecute carries with it the discretion to choose the 
statute that will be charged. United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 124, 99 
S.Ct. 2198, 2204, 60 L.Ed.2d 755 (1979). The district court has no power to deny 
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the United States Attorney his prerogative under the Separation of Powers 
doctrine. 
United States v. Edmonson, 792 F .2d 1492, 1497 (9th Cir. 1986). 
Whether termed as a separation of powers or prosecutor discretion issue, each doctrine 
appreciates and protects the independence of a prosecutor's decisions. Speculation about the 
timeliness of a prosecutor's review process (unless the statute of limitations is at issue) is beyond 
the courts' province. The CCPA's assertion that the investigation and review were ongoing 
should have been the end of the analysis. 
2. Prosecution Files Are Protected. 
On May 4, 2012, the District Court explained: 
But it would appear to this Court that we will at that point be dealing with an 
inactive investigatory record. That State will have made a decision as to whether 
someone would be charged, if anybody. And my expectation would be, unless the 
State could show by evidence presented at that time, that the Court should not - or 
find that the information is exempt from disclosure, that it should be all disclosed 
to Mr. Coulter and his client at that time. 
(Tr May 4,2012, p. 17, LL. 6-15.) 
The District Court opened the May 17, 2012 hearing, stating: 
For the record this case is CV 2012-3744, and the court had previously held a 
hearing in this case and continued it to today's date with the hope that the grounds 
upon which the respondent was denying disclosure of this documentation no 
longer existed because the investigation was completed and the decision making 
had been made regarding prosecution. 
(Tr May 17,2012, p. 1, LL. 9-16.) 
The Court's June 5, 2012 Memorandum Decision on Petition for Access to Public Records 
stated: 
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Further, Petitioner cites to a letter written by the Payette County Prosecuting 
Attorney declaring that her office was no longer in possession of the documents 
as they had been forwarded to the Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney "[Ujpon 
completion of the Idaho State Police Investigation". Emphasis added. 
Nevertheless, the Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney's Office continues to 
maintain that this remains on [sic] ongoing investigation even though over four 
and one-half months have gone by with no activity. 
I.e. § 9-335(3) clearly sets forth that an "inactive investigatory record 
shall be disclosed unless the disclosure would violate the provisions of subsection 
(l)(a) through (f)" of this code section. 
(R p. 52, emphasis in original.) 
It appears the District Court believed that once the police investigation was delivered to 
the prosecutor, the Act's protection of the investigation information ceased. In Nation v. State, 
Dep 't o/Correction, this Court explained: 
Moreover, under the Idaho Public Records Act, title 9, chapter 3, Idaho Code, 
these records are exempt from public disclosure. I.C. §§ 9-340B(1); 9-335. The 
information here was an investigatory record, I.C. § 9-337(6), and the IDOC, 
sheriffs office and Ada County Prosecutor are law enforcement agencies, I.C. § 
9-337(7). 
Id. at 188-89,158 P.3d at 964-65 (emphasis added). 
The Act specifically defines prosecutors as "law enforcement agenc[ies]" in Idaho Code 
§ 9-335(3), ensuring the continuity of protection and preserving the integrity of the criminal case 
through the end of the court process. The IP AA asserts this inclusion of prosecutors into the 
statute would make no sense if the exemption ended when the police delivered the investigation 
to the prosecuting attorney. 
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3. Even if the Investigation Was "Inactive." the Records Would Still Be Protected from 
Release. 
As explained above, the investigation at bar was never inactive. But even if it had been, 
it could not be released carte blanche. Idaho Code § 9-335(3) protects the contents of an 
inactive investigation to the extent release "would violate the provisions of subsection (1 )(a) 
through (f) .... " Id. 
Applying the Act to an inactive law enforcement file may render § 9-335(1)(a) and 
(b) (interfering with enforcement proceedings and depriving a person of a right to a fair trial or 
an impartial adjudication) moot, but § 9-335(1)(c) - the protection from unwarranted invasions 
of personal privacy - still safeguards significant information, as well as the potential for 
disclosing investigative techniques and procedures and any concern about endangering the life or 
physical safety of law enforcement personnel. Even when a record is truly inactive, the Act still 
protects certain (and perhaps all) of the contents. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The IP AA petitions this Court for amicus status and the opportunity to support the 
CCP A's office in this appeal. The IP AA seeks clarity and uniformity in the interpretation of the 
Idaho Public Records Act on behalf of Idaho's Prosecuting Attorneys. 
Public records cases are unique proceedings. Trial courts are directed by case law from 
this Court, sister courts and the U.S. Supreme Court, to apply the law with practicality in mind, 
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much as this Court directs the application of Idaho Court Administrative Rule 32(i).14 These 
laws, court decisions and rules protect those who find themselves intertwined with the justice 
system, as well as protecting the very system itself from the potential interference dissemination 
of investigatory information could bring. 
Where release of information would interfere with enforcement proceedings; deprive 
either party (in a civil or criminal proceeding) of a fair or impartial adjudication; invade 
someone's privacy; disclose investigative techniques or threaten the safety of an officer, the trial 
court's obligation is to prevent that occasion. 
The IP AA respectfully asks this Court to provide that intended protection by reversing 
the District Court's decision. 
DATED thisL:{- day of December, 2012. 
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
By: ~~., J~. Dickinson 
Senior Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
14This Court's Administrative Rule 32, which protects court records for many of the same 
reasons Idaho Code § 9-335 protects governmental records, instructs Idaho trial courts to make 
broad, common sense determinations when deciding to release or protect court records. 
In applying these rules, the court is referred to the traditional legal concepts in the 
law of the right to a fair trial, invasion of privacy, defamation, and invasion of 
proprietary business records as well as common sense respect for shielding highly 
intimate material about persons. 
Idaho Court Administrative Rule 32(i) (emphasis added). 
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